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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated §78A-3-102(3)0). On October 29, 2010, the Utah Supreme Court
transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78A-3-102(4), and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Appellant, Roger van Frank appeals the Memorandum Decision of Judge
Kate A. Toomey granting the Appellee's ("the City") motion for summary judgment and
the district court's Order Denying Roger van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to
Reconsider.
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. van Frank provides
this Court with his Statement of Issues for Review:
ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the district court incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary
judgment and denied Mr. van Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider.
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr..van Frank's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51)

1
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. This Court reviews a district court's
ruling granting summary judgment for correctness. See Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v.
Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App 407, \ 31, 175 P.3d 572. No deference is given to the trial
court's legal conclusions. See Richards v. Security Pacific Nat'I Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 608
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for new trial
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Com 'n, 945 P.2d 125
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).
ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that portions of Mr. van Frank's
declaration are not properly supported for purposes of summary judgment.
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43) and through Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of discretion. The admissibility of evidence is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, \ 11, 131
P.3d252.
ISSUE NO. 3:
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that a letter written by the
Director of the City's Building Services Division on the City's letterhead is hearsay.
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This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting-memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. Questions regarding the meaning and
application of a rule of evidence is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See
State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App 322, ^ 14, 142 P.3d 581.
ISSUE NO. 4:
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that Mr. van Frank has not
provided evidence sufficient to prove or even raise a question of fact regarding his claim
that the City acted in furtherance of a municipal policy in denying Mr. van Frank the
ability to practice architecture to the full extent of Utah law.
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51)

<

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. Entitlement to summary judgment is a
question of law. Whether the trial court correctly held that there were no genuine issues
of disputed fact is reviewed for correctness. See K&TInc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627
(Utah 1994).
<
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ISSUE NO. 5:
Whether the district court incorrectly determined that Mr. van Frank does not have
standing to seek injunctive relief.
This issue was preserved pursuant to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment and supporting memorandum (R.64-104), Mr. van Frank's Memorandum in
Opposition to the City's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 105-43), and through Mr. van
Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider and supporting memorandum. (R.248-51)
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Correctness. A standing determination is primarily a
question of law and reviewed for correctness. Any necessary factual findings made by
the district court are given some deference. See Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009
UT40,f 14,216P.3d944.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES
Utah Constitution Article I Section 7:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-1-103:
"There is created within the Department of Commerce the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing. The Division shall administer and enforce all
licensing laws of title 58."

4
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-101:
"This chapter is known as the Architects Licensing Act."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-102(6)(b):
"Practice of architecture does not include the practice of professional engineering
as defined in Section 58-22-102, but a licensed architect may perform such professional
engineering work as is incidental to the practice of architects."
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-3a-602(2):
"Any final plan and specifications of a building prepared by or under the
supervision of the licensed architect shall bear the seal of the architect when submitted to
a client, or when submitted to a building official for the purpose of obtaining a building
permit, even if the practice is exempt from licensure under Section 58-3a-304."
Utah Aministrative Code, Rule 156-3a-102(6)(a)-(e):
(6) "Incidental practice" means "architecture work as is incidental to the practice of
engineering" as used in Subsection 58-22-102(9) and "engineering work as is incidental
to the practice of architecture" as used in Subsection 58-3a-102(6) which:
(a) can be safely and competently performed by the licensee without jeopardizing
the life, health, property and welfare of the public;
(b) is secondary and substantially less in scope and magnitude when compared to
the work performed or to be performed by the licensee in the licensed profession;

<

(c) is work in which the licensee is folly responsible for the incidental practice
performed as provided in Subsection 58-3a-603(l) or Subsection 58-22-603(1);
<
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(d) is work that affects not greater than 49 occupants as determined in Section
1004 of the 2009 International Building Code; and
(e) is work included on a project with a construction value not greater than 15
percent of the overall construction value for the project including all changes or
additions to the contracted or agreed upon work.
Utah Rules of Evidence, 801(d)(2)(C),(D):
"A statement is not hearsay if: The statement is offered against a party and i s . . . a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject,
or a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship."
Salt Lake City Ordinances, Title 18.08.020: Powers and Duties of the
Division:
"The functions of the division of building and housing services shall be:
A. To enforce the zoning laws of Salt Lake City and to Inspect, or cause to be
inspected, all buildings and structures erected, or proposed to be erected in the city;
B. To carry out, enforce and perform all duties, provisions and mandates
designated, made and set forth in the ordinances of the city concerning zoning,
building, plumbing, electrical and mechanical construction, and repair, including
uniform housing code regulations.
C. To examine and approve all plans and specifications before permits shall be
issued, and to execute all permits, certificates and notices required to be issued;

6
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D. To examine all applicants for licensing and registration in accordance with
requirements of Chapter 18.16 of this title, and issue same in accordance with the
requirements of this title; and
E. To perform all the functions and have all the powers required of and conferred
on the building official by the ordinances of the city.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE / COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Mr. van Frank appeals from a Memorandum Decision entered by the district court
on September 16, 2010 in which the court granted the City's motion for summary
judgment and denied Mr. van Frank's motion for summary judgment (R.236-47) Mr. van
Frank also appeals the district court's Order Denying his Motion for New Trial or to
Reconsider. The order was entered by the district court on February 1, 2011. (R.305-06)
This case concerns the City's unauthorized actions in refusing to permit an
architect to perform incidental engineering work as allowed under Utah law and requiring
an engineer's opinion as a condition for approval of an architect's stamped plans, thereby
denying an architect the ability to practice his profession to the full extent allowed by
state law. The City absolutely lacks the authority to make such determinations under
Utah law. Mr. van Frank seeks redress for the harm done to him by the City by imposing
unauthorized restrictions on the scope of his state issued architect's licence and thereby
depriving him of a property right without due process. Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction
i
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prohibiting the Division from overstepping its authority by making further unauthorized
determinations regarding-the permissible scope of an architect's work under Utah law.
On February 5, 2010, the City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and
supporting memorandum. (R.50-59) The Declaration of Roger Van Frank was filed on
February 26, 2010 and Mr. van Frank filed his Opposition to the City's Motion for
Summary Judgment and his own Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on March 5,
2010. (R.60-143) The City filed its reply memorandum in support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment on March 23, 2010 and filed its opposition to Mr. van Frank's
Motion on April 2, 2010. (R. 144-71) Mr. van Frank then filed his reply memorandum in
support of his Motion on April 26, 2010. (R.185-202)
After a Request to Submit for Decision was filed by Mr. van Frank on May 10,
2010 the District Court entered an Order requesting counsel for both parties to provide
supplemental authorities. (R.226-27) A response to the Order was filed by Mr. van Frank
on August 6, 2010. (R.228-32) No response was filed by the City. A hearing on both
Motions for Summary Judgment was held on June 16, 2010, in which the District Court
heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement. (R.225) A Memorandum
Decision was entered by the District Court on September 16, 2010, in which Judge Kate
A. Toomey denied Mr. van Frank's Motion and granted the City's Motion. (R.236-47).
Mr. van Frank filed a Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider with supporting
memorandum on September 29, 2010. (R.248-68) Mr. van Frank filed his Notice of

8
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Appeal on October 14, 2010. (R.269-70) The City's memorandum in opposition to the
Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider was filed on October 25, 2010. (R.273-77) Mr.
van Frank's reply memorandum in support of the Motion was filed on November 2, 2010.
(R.282-88) A Hearing was held on the Motion on January 7, 2011. (R.296) The District
Court denied Mr. van Frank's Motion and a Memorandum Decision was entered on
September 16, 2010. (R.236-47) A final Order denying the Motion was entered by Judge
Kate A. Toomey on February 1, 2011. (R.305-06).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Roger van Frank is an architect at all relevant times licensed by the State of

Utah, Department of Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing.
(R.23)
2.

The Salt Lake City Building Services and Licensing Division (the

"Division") is a division of the Department of Community Development of Salt Lake City
Corporation. (R.68) Mr. van Frank had a contractual relationship with William Buchanan
in or about June 2007 to provide architectural services to design a garage with a loft that
Mr. Buchanan proposed to build at 721 Browning Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R.61)
3.

i

Mr. Buchanan used architectural drawings prepared by Mr. van Frank to

apply for a building permit with the Division. (R.53)
I

(

9
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4.

As part of the architectural drawings prepared for Mr. Buchanan's permit,

Mr. van Frank included calculations that he relied upon in designing the floor system for
the loft on the building plans. (R.61)
5.

The plans showed the calculations of section modulus and load of wooden

beams to be used for the loft's floor systems. (R.61)
6.

It is understood by Mr. van Frank and admitted to by the City that the

permit was conditionally denied by the Division based upon Mr. van Frank's calculations
but subsequently approved without change to the plans. See ^ 11, infra, (R.53)
7.

The Division made a determination that Mr. van Frank's calculations

exceeded the scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state
law and the Division required Mr. Buchannan to provide the opinion of a structural
engineer to certify the accuracy of Mr. van Frank's calculations. (R.53)
8.

Mr. van Frank was never contacted by the Division prior to the denial of the

permit to answer any questions or explain his calculations. (R.61)
9.

A year prior to doing work for Mr. Buchanan, Mr. van Frank contracted

with a Mr. Thomas to perform architectural work. It is the understanding of Mr. van
Frank that the Division conditionally denied a building permit submitted by Mr. Thomas
on grounds similar to the Buchanan permit. This understanding is confirmed by a letter
received by Mr. van Frank from Orion Goff, director of the Division, explaining the
grounds for the denial of the permit. The letter states that the Division's staff made a

10
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"judgment call" based on Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 that Mr. van Frank's
work exceeded the scope-of incidental engineering work allowed an architect. (R.62;
R.87-89, Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment)
10.

After the Division denied the permit, Mr. Buchanan obtained the opinion of

a structural engineer, which certified that the calculations made by Mr. van Frank were, in
fact, accurate and safe. (R.53)
11.

The Division then issued Mr. Buchanan's permit, requiring no alteration of

Mr. van Frank's plans, once the engineer's opinion confirmed the engineering
calculations that Mr. van Frank included on the plans. (R.53)
12.

In Utah, architects are licensed exclusively by the Department of

Commerce, Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL"). See U.C.A.
§58-3a-101.
13.

State law expressly permits an architect to perform such engineering work

as is incidental to the practice of architecture. See U.C.A. § 58-3a-102(6)(b).
14.

State law also provides that DOPL has exclusive authority to make

determinations as to whether an architect's engineering work is incidental to the practice
of architecture. See U.C.A. § 58-1-103.

i
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15.

The regulation cited in Mr. Goff s letter was adopted by DOPL, expressly

and solely for its use. See (R.87-89) Utah State Administrative Code, R. 156-3a102(6)(a)-(e).
16.

Under Title 18 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances, the Division is granted the

authority to enforce the Uniform Building Code. See Salt Lake City Ordinances, Title
18.08.020 - Powers and Duties of the Division.
17.

Nothing in Title 18 or elsewhere in the City Ordinances grants the Division

authority to determine or make judgment calls as to whether an architect exceeded the
permissible scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed a licensed architect under
Utah law. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

MR. VAN FRANK'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT AND HE PROVIDED
EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL
FACT.
The district court incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary judgment and

denied Mr. van Frank's Motion for New Trial or to Reconsider. The district court should
be reversed. Mr. van Frank's claims against the City have merit. Mr. van Frank provided
admissible evidence sufficient to show that the City, through the Division, exceeded its
authority in interpreting state licensing laws and limiting the scope of Mr. van Frank's
architect's license, and thereby violating his property right to utilize his architect's license
to the full extent allowed by state law without due process. The City has provided no

12
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evidence to refute Mr. van Frank's claims or made any effort to explain its actions. In
light of the City's failure to controvert the evidence submitted by Mr. van Frank, there are
at minimum genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by a finder of fact.
II.

THE LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY'S BUILDINGS
SERVICES DIVISION IS NOT HEARSAY.
The district court is in error in ruling that the letter from Orion Goff referring to

the Thomas incident is hearsay. This letter is an admission by a party opponent under
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and was drafted by the Director of the City's
Building Services Division under the scope of his employment with the City, on the
City's letterhead. It is not hearsay and is evidence of a Division policy to make
"judgment calls" which limit the scope of Mr. van Frank's architect's license by denying
him the state-granted right to engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Mr. Goff s
letter should have been considered by the district court and if it had been, it would have
established at minimum a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a
policy followed by the Division to limit the scope of architects' licenses in violation of
Mr. van Frank's due process rights.
III.

MR. VAN FRANK PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF A CITY POLICY.
If the City's letter articulating its policy is not excluded on hearsay grounds, Mr.

van Frank has provided sufficient evidence in support of his claim that the City acted in
furtherance of a policy in restricting his ability to practice architecture to the full extent of
Utah law. At the very least Mr. van Frank has raised a factual issue as to the existence of
13
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a City policy, a widespread practice, or a decision of a person with final policymaking
authority to improperly limit the scope of an architect's license. The City has not
provided any evidence to refute or deny the claims or evidence presented by Mr. van
Frank.
IV.

MR. VAN FRANK ESTABLISHED GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
Mr. van Frank has standing to seek injunctive relief. There is a realistic

probability of the City, through the Division, restricting the scope of Mr. van Frank's
license in the future. Mr. van Frank has provided evidence of the Division's failure to
recognize the scope of his architect's license on two separate but factually
indistinguishable occasions and the city has failed to provide any evidence that the
Division acted within its authority in doing so or that its actions against Mr. van Frank
were exceptional and not likely to be repeated.
V.

MR. VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION IS PROPERLY SUPPORTED FOR
PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Mr. van Frank's declaration is properly supported for purposes of summary

judgment. The district court is in error in ruling that certain statements of material fact
set forth by Mr. van Frank are not properly supported for purposes of summary judgment.
These statements are based upon personal knowledge and Mr. van Frank is qualified as a
licensed architect to make the statements set forth in his Declaration.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court's Rulings Should Be Reversed.
The district court incorrectly found that there are no genuine issues of fact and
incorrectly granted the City's motion for summary judgment. (R.236-47) The district
court's ruling granting summary judgment for the City should be reversed. Summary
judgment is appropriate only when the record indicates that there are no genuine issues of
material fact. Bowler v. Deseret Village Ass 'n, Inc., 922 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah 1996). Should
it be found that genuine issues of fact exist, the reviewing court must reverse the grant of
summary judgment and remand for trial on those issues. See Id. No deference is given to
a trial court's legal conclusion. See Richards v. Sec. Pacific Nat'I Bank, 849 P.2d 606,
608 (Utah Ct.App. 1993).
Mr. van Frank has at minimum raised genuine issues of material fact with regard
to the propriety of the City's actions taken against the scope of his architect's licence.
Mr. van Frank has presented admissible evidence through his Declaration and the letter
from Orion Goff, Director of the City's Building Services Division, that demonstrates the
City's implementation of a municipal policy which works to improperly restrict the scope

,

of Mr. van Frank's architect's licence by not allowing him to engage in the incidental
practice of engineering, which he is allowed to do under Utah law. See Utah Code Ann. §
58-3a-102(6)(b).

i
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The City failed to provide any admissible evidence either in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment or in opposition to Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment that controverts the facts set forth by Mr. van Frank. If not sufficient to allow
Mr. van Frank to prevail on summary judgment, then the admissible evidence provided by
Mr. van Frank at minimum creates genuine issues of material fact that preclude either
party from prevailing on summary judgment. The district court's memorandum decision
granting summary judgment on the City's motion should therefore be reversed.
The district court also incorrectly denied Mr. van Frank's motion for new trial or to
reconsider. The district court ruled that Mr. van Frank's motion was not well taken
procedurally or substantively. (R.306) This ruling should be reversed.
Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to Reconsider is properly brought
under Rule 59(a)(7). Mr. van Frank moved the district court to reconsider its judgment in
favor the City and/or grant a new trial. Motions for reconsideration have been allowed as
a means for the Court to reconsider its ruling. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884
P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Mr. van Frank argued that there has been an error in
law in the Court's ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment and properly
requested that the Court re-examine its ruling in light of Mr. van Frank's Rule 59 Motion.
Mr. van Frank's motion to reconsider or for new trial has merit and was improperly
denied. The district court's denial of the motion to reconsider or for new trial should be
reversed.
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L

MR. VAN FRANK'S CLAIMS HAVE MERIT AND AT A MINIMUM HE
PROVIDED EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT.
Mr. van Frank's claims in this case concern unauthorized actions of the City's

Building Services Division ("the Division") in limiting the scope of incidental
engineering work allowed an architect. The Division required an unnecessaiy engineer's
opinion as a condition for approval of Mr. van Frank's stamped building plans, thereby
denying him the ability to practice his profession as allowed by State law and depriving
him of his due process rights. The Division absolutely lacks the authority to make such a
determination. Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction prohibiting the Division from
overstepping its authority in making future determinations regarding the permissible
scope of an architect's work under Utah law.
A.

Mr. van Frank Has the Authority to Perform Incidental Engineering Work.

As an architect licensed by state of Utah, Mr. van Frank has the authority to
i

engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Utah Code Annotated § 58-3a-102(6)(b)
provides that "a licensed architect may perform such professional engineering work as is
incidental to the practice of architecture." Utah Administrative Code, Rule 156-3a-

{

102(6)(a)-(e) provides factors to be applied solely by DOPL in determining whether an
architect's engineering work is incidental. These factors, include safely, competency,
adequate education, training, relation to architectural work, scope, magnitude, and
whether the license architect is fully responsible for the incidental work.
i
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The Division did not provide any analysis or provide any reasoning as to why Mr.
van Frank's work did not-comply with this rule. It did not identify a single factor that Mr.
van Frank failed to satisfy. There are no facts in the record that suggest that Mr. van
Frank is not competent, lacks adequate education and training, or that the engineering
work performed by him was not related to architecture. The undisputed facts demonstrate
that Mr. van Frank has the authority to perform engineering work incidental to the
practice of architecture. More importantly, the Division provided no opportunity for Mr.
van Frank to be heard to challenge the Division's "judgment call" and to ensure that the
decision was rational and not arbitrary and capricious.
B.

The Division Does Not Have the Authority to Make Licensing
Determinations.

The Division completely lacks the authority to make determinations of any kind
regarding the scope of an architect's license. The Division admitted making such
determinations in its letter to Mr. van Frank regarding previous architectural work done
for a Mr. Thomas. In the letter, Orion Goff, director of the Division, states that the
grounds for denying the permit were based on the Division's "judgment calls" that Mr.
van Frank's work exceeded the scope of incidental engineering work allowed an
architect. The letter states, "[i]t is our judgment based on Utah Admin Rule 156-3a-102
that [engineering work] would not constitute "incidental" work for an architect..." (R.8789, Exhibit "A" to Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment). It is understood by Mr. van Frank and can be assumed that Mr. Goff s letter
18
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in the Thomas case sets forth the grounds for denial of the Buchanan permit in the case at
hand. In both cases the Division required only the opinion of an engineer to certify the
accuracy of the incidental engineering work done by Mr. van Frank as shown on his
plans, and the Buchanan plans were eventually approved as written by Mr. van Frank.
(R.61-62) Thus, obviously the plans were not unsafe and did not violate the building
code which the Division is charged with enforcing. The Division simply refused to let
Mr. van Frank engage in the incidental practice of engineering without any process for
him to be heard. It never articulated any defect with the plans. It just refused to accept an
architect's stamp in lieu of an engineer's stamp as a requirement of approving the plans.
The Division's authority is limited to enforcing the uniform building code. See
Title 18.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances. While the Division does have the
authority to question a set of building plans if sufficient safety concerns or articulable
building code violations are raised, no such concerns were expressed in this case. Mr.
i

Goff s letter in reference to the earlier application does not reference any safety concerns
or building code violations. (R.87-89) Indeed, given that the plans prepared by Mr. van
Frank for Mr. Buchanan were ultimately approved without revision, it is apparent that

\

these plans were safe and complied with the building code. When there are no conflicts
with the building code, the Division must accept plans stamped with the seal of a licensed
architect and pass any concerns it may have regiarding the scope of engineering work done
by an architect to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL").
i
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DOPL has exclusive authority granted by the Utah State Legislature to administer
and enforce all licensing laws under Title 58 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §
58-1-103. The licensing laws governing architects fall under this Title. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-3a-101. The statute that authorizes architects to perform professional
engineering work that is incidental to the practice of architecture also falls under this
Title. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-3a-102(6)(b). The determination of what qualifies as
engineering work "incidental" to the practice of architecture is a determination to be
made solely by DOPL. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-103.
The Utah Administrative Rules governing licensing were adopted by DOPL to
enable it to administer Title 58. Utah Administrative Rule 156-3a-102 specifically
governs the licensing of architects. As discussed supra, this Rule contains a list of factors
that are to be applied by DOPL in determining what type of engineering work is
"incidental" for an architect. See Utah Admin. Rule 156-3a(6)(a)-(e). There are no
statutory or regulatory provisions that grant the Division the authority to make such
determinations, let alone arbitrary "judgment calls" concerning the same. There is also
nothing within Title 18 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances which grants the Division any
authority to administer or interpret State licensing laws and regulations.
The Division exceeded its authority in making its.arbitrary "judgment call" and
determining that Mr. van Frank exceeded the permissible scope of "incidental"
engineering work by an architect without affording him any semblance of due process to
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enable him to defend his work and his authority to engage in the incidental practice of
engineering. If the Division did in fact have concerns over the work done by Mr. van
Frank it should have identified them, notified Mr. van Frank and passed on any
complaints to DOPL.
C.

Mr. van Frank Was Denied a Property Interest Without Due Process.

Section 7 of the Utah Constitution states, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Mr. van Frank was deprived of a
property interest without due process of law when the Division arbitrarily limited the
scope of his architect's license.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Utah
Constitution is self-executing. See Spackman v. Bd. ofEduc. of Box Elder County Sch.
Dist, 2000 UT 87,110, 16 P.3d 533. This means that it may be judicially enforced
without implementing legislation. Id. at f 7. Mr. van Frank has stated a due process
i

claim under Utah law and he may enforce that claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Utah Constitution.
That the building permit was applied for in Mr. Buchanan's name and not Mr. van

i

Frank's is not determinative of standing in this case and the district court correctly ruled
that Mr. van Frank does have standing to seek damages. (R.242) Architects do not apply
(

for a building permit for plans they have prepared. The owner of the project applies for
the permit. Mr. van Frank was damaged by the Division's denial of his due process rights
<
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when the Defendant denied him the ability to engage in the incidental practice of
engineering as his state-granted license allows, and consequently damaged his reputation
with his client.
To state a claim for deprivation of due process, a party must allege three elements:
1) that through state action he was, 2) deprived of a constitutionally recognized life,
liberty, or property interest, 3) without an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful way. See Millet v. Logan City, 2006 UT App 466, f 8, 147 P.3d 971.
1.

Mr. van Frank's Property Rights were Deprived under Color of State
Law.

Mr. van Frank's property rights were deprived under color of state law and
in accordance with a municipal policy. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the
Division, an agency of the named Defendant in this action, Salt Lake City Corporation,
follows a policy of making "judgment calls" regarding the scope of an architect's work.
This practice is set forth in the June 2006 letter from Orion Goff to Mr. van Frank in
which Mr. Goff explains that Mr. van Frank's plans for a prior project were rejected
based upon a judgment call made by Division staff. As previously discussed Mr. Goff
states in the letter that, " it is our judgment, based on Utah Admin R. 15 6-3 a-102 that a
lateral analysis of the area in question to determine the seismic resisting forces would not
constitute "incidental" work for an architect...." (R.87-89)
This letter serves as undisputed proof that Mr. van Frank's property rights were
deprived through state action under the color of state law. While written regarding
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another project and building permit for a Mr. Thomas, both the Thomas and Buchanan
incidents are factually indistinguishable. In both instances, the Division made an arbitrary
judgment call in denying the permits based upon the assertion that Mr. van Frank
exceeded the scope of his architect's license in preparing the building plans. Given the
Division's silence as to the reason that the Buchanan permit was denied there is no other
reasonable explanation for the Division's conduct other than the fact that the Division
took the same arbitrary position in this case with the Buchanan permit as it did with the
Thomas permit. This municipal policy directly deprived Mr. van Frank of his property
right to practice architecture to the full extent allowed under Utah law.
2.

Mr. van Frank was Deprived of a Property Right.

Mr. van Frank was deprived of a property interest through the Division's
arbitrary restriction of his architect's license. Property interests are created and their
dimensions defined by existing rules and understandings that stem from them. See Hyde
Park Co. v. Santa Fe Council 226 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). After a license to
practice a particular profession has been acquired, a licensed professional has a protected
property interest in practicing that profession. Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam 'rs,
842 A.2d 936, 946 (Penn. 2004). The right to engage in a profession is a property right
which is entitled to protection by the law and the courts.. Clayton v. Bennett, 298 P.2d
531, 533 (Utah 1956).

(
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The right to work and earn a living in one's chosen profession serves as one of the
fundamental freedoms that the Constitution serves to protect. Mr. van Frank is licensed
to practice architecture by the state of Utah and therefore has the right to practice in his
chosen field to the full extent that the law allows. See id. Mr. van Frank complied with
state law in preparing the building plans and properly provided the requisite calculations
for the floor plans (the calculation of the section modulus and load of the wood beams) on
the plans. (R.61) The plans also bore his architect seal as is required by Utah Code
Annotated § 58-3a-602(2).
Mr. van Frank has a protected property right to practice architecture in the state of
Utah and he has the right under state law to engage in the incidental practice of
engineering. Mr. van Frank was deprived of a property right when the Division limited
his ability to fully practice architecture as allowed under state law by arbitrarily rejecting
his plans and requiring his client to obtain an unnecessary engineer's opinion.
3.

Mr. van Frank Was Not Given the Opportunity to Be Heard.

Mr. van Frank was never given the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
time and manner. In both instances where his plans were rejected, he was never directly
notified by the Division of its decision but instead found out through his clients. (R.61).
He was never afforded the opportunity to explain his work or demonstrate that his
calculations were not only accurate but that such work was permissible for him to
perform as a licensed architect.
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The Division's decision imposed a significant impairment on Mr. van Frank's
ability to practice his profession by questioning his professional skills without a hearing
or even a telephone call or letter to ask questions about his work before rejecting it and
informing his clients of the rejection. The essential requirement of due process is that
every citizen be afforded "his day in court" or in this case, an opportunity for Mr. van
Frank to defend and explain his work before it was arbitrarily rejected. See Celebrity
Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1297 (Utah 1982). Mr. van
Frank was not afforded due process and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time
or manner.
Furthermore, the Division's "judgment call" was arbitrary and capricious. A
decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence and a
reasonable mind would not reach the same conclusion. See Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of
Adjustment of Salt Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, f 12, 116 P.3d 978. The Division's
unreasonable decisions requiring further engineering opinions were not supported by any
evidence or analysis and were indeed arbitrary and capricious. No safety issues or
building code violations were articulated or identified. The Division merely required an
engineer's stamp on the plans instead of allowing the stamp of an architect. The plans
were approved without change, except that the plans bore an engineer's stamp instead of
an architect's stamp.

<
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D.

The Granting of a Permanent Injunction is Proper in This Case.

Because of the Division's arbitrary and wholly unauthorized policy of determining
the permissible scope of engineering work allowed an architect, Mr. van Frank seeks a
permanent injunction against the Division. The injunction sought after must prohibit the
Division from making future determinations regarding what an architect may and may not
do under state law and require that unless there is a building code violation or legitimate
safety concern, the Division must accept an architect's stamped plans. Any and all
concerns pertaining to the scope of the architect's work must be forwarded to DOPL.
The Division is not qualified or authorized to even make a preliminary decision pertaining
to the scope of work performed by a licensed architect.
Mr. van Frank will continue to suffer irreparable harm due to his inability to
practice architecture to the full extent that his state-granted license allows unless a
permanent injunction against the Division is ordered. Irreparable harm has been defined
in the context of injunctive relief as "wrongs of a repeated nature and continuing
character

" System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983), citing

Black's Law Dictionary 707 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
The Division has already denied building permits based upon Mr. van Frank's
building plans on two separate occasions for similar, if not identical, reasons. The
Division has shown that it follows a policy of making determinations concerning the
scope of a licensed architect's work. The Division is wholly unauthorized to make such
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determinations. Injunctive relief is designed to prevent a threatened wrong or compel the
cessation of a continuing-one. Systems Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427. A permanent
injunction is necessary in this case to prevent the Division's continuing practice of
making these unauthorized determinations.
An injunction would not pose any damage to the Division that would outweigh the
damage to Mr. van Frank if an injunction is not granted. In fact, an injunction would only
ensure that the Division's actions and policies stay within the proper bounds set by State
law. The injunction would not be adverse to the public interest and in fact would ensure
that all architects licensed by the state of Utah are treated fairly and properly in their
dealings with the Division. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr. van Frank has a
property right to practice architecture to the full extent that his State-granted license
allows. The facts also show that this right has been diminished through the Division's
arbitrary and unauthorized actions. The Division is wholly unauthorized to define the
limits of an architects license. This determination must be left to the sole discretion of
DOPL.
Any legal remedies would be inadequate in this case. Money damages would not

<

prevent the Division from taking future arbitrary action against Mr. van Frank's
architect's license. Only the granting of an injunction will ensure that the Division stops
overstepping its authority in limiting the scope of Mr. van Frank's state-granted
architect's license.
<
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II.

THE LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE CITY'S BUILDINGS
SERVICE DIVISION IS NOT HEARSAY.
The district court's determination that the letter to Mr. van Frank is hearsay is

incorrect and should be reversed. In its Memorandum Decision, the district court
incorrectly states that the letter is inadmissible hearsay and does not provide any analysis
or authority to support this ruling. (R.245) Mr. van Frank's Motion for a New Trial or to
Reconsider invited the district court to review or justify its ruling. It erred in not doing
so. The district court's ruling determining that the letter is hearsay is unsupported by law.
Questions regarding the meaning and application of a rule of evidence is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bujan, 2006 UT App. 322, ^ 14, 142
P.3d 581. The letter serves as admissible evidence sufficient to at the very least establish
an issue of material fact. The district court's failure to consider it was not harmless error
and its exclusion was prejudicial to Mr. van Frank's case. It should be deemed
admissible and considered by the finder of fact as evidence of the Division's arbitrary
actions taken against Mr. van Frank.
Mr. van Frank offered the letter from the Director of the City's Building Services
Division regarding a prior permit application to establish that the denial of the Buchanan
permit was incident to a Division policy of making judgment calls about whether
architect's plans exceeded the scope of engineering work allowed an architect. The
circumstances in the Buchanan permit are factually indistinguishable from those of a prior
experience Mr. Van Frank had with the Division, where it had explained why it was
28
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unwilling to approve his architect's plans without a letter from an engineer certifying the
engineering calculations Mr. van Frank had presented on the plans. Mr. van Frank
submitted the letter from Orion Goff dated June 29, 2006 as evidence of the Division's
policy to make "judgment calls" and improperly restrict the scope of Mr. van Frank's
architect's license.
The letter is not hearsay and is an admission by a party opponent under Rule
801(d)(2)(C),(D) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The Rule states, in pertinent part:
"A statement is not hearsay if: The statement is offered against a party and
is: a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship."
Mr. Goff is an agent or servant of the City, indeed he is the Director of the City's
Building Services Division, and his statement was made in his official capacity as
Director of the City's Building Services Division on the official letterhead of Salt Lake
City Corporation. Salt Lake City Corporation as a municipal corporation is only capable
of acting through its employees and agents. Mr. Goff was not speaking on behalf of
himself in the letter but was speaking on behalf of the Division and the City. This is
evidenced by the fact that Mr. Goff signed the letter in his capacity as Director of the
City's Building Services Division and that the letter was on official letterhead of the City.
The letter from Orion Goff is not hearsay. The district court erred in ruling it was hearsay
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<

and thus inadmissible and therefore ruling that Mr. van Frank had not produced evidence
of a municipal policy in granting the City's motion for summary judgment.
The letter indicates that the Division rejected Van Frank's plans in the Thomas
case because it believed his calculations went beyond incidental engineering work. The
facts of the permit denial in the Buchanan matter are so similar as to be indistinguishable.
As in the Thomas matter, in the Buchanan matter the Division conditionally denied the
issuance of a permit without an engineer's opinion confirming engineering calculations
shown on the stamped plans of a licensed architect. The City accepted the plans in the
Buchanan matter as written, without any change or modification once an engineer's
opinion was provided. The only requirement for approval of the plans was thus an
engineer's opinion, reflecting the Division's refusal to permit Mr. van Frank, a licensed
architect, to engage in the incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under
state law. Because the plans were accepted as drawn once an engineer's opinion was
provided, it is manifest that the Division acted in the Buchanan case pursuant to the same
practice that it had explained in denying the Thomas permit. Thus the letter from the
Division director, combined with the factual similarity of the circumstances between the
two cases where architect's plans were deemed insufficient without an engineer's
opinion, provides at least a question of fact concerning the existence of a municipal
policy. The district court's ruling that the Orion Goff letter is hearsay must be reversed.
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IIL

MR. VAN FRANK PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF A CITY POLICY.
The district court incorrectly held that there were no genuine issues of material fact

and granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court's decision
should be reversed. The district court stated in its Memorandum Decision that Mr. van
Frank failed to allege that "the City had an officially promulgated policy pursuant to
which his constitutional rights were violated." (R.240) However, under the test for
proving municipal liability as set forth by the district court in its decision, Mr. van Frank
did provide sufficient evidence to create a question of fact concerning the existence of a
municipal policy and the City failed to provide any evidence of its own to rebut or call
into question the evidence presented by Mr. van Frank. Whether the district court
correctly held that there were no genuine issues of disputed fact is reviewed for
correctness. See K&TInc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994).
Mr. van Frank has properly alleged the existence of a municipal policy by
i

providing evidence of a city policy to limit the scope of an architect's license by not
allowing them to engage in the incidental practice of engineering. Architects are allowed
to engage in the incidental practice of engineering pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 58-

\

3a-102(6)(b).
As recognized by the district court in its Memorandum Decision, municipal
liability may be based on any of the following: 1) an express municipal policy; 2) a
"widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal
4
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policy, is so pervasive and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of
law; or 3) the decision of a person with 'final policymaking authority'." See City of St.
Louis v. Praprtnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 127 (1988). (R.240)
Mr. van Frank presented evidence of two separate instances where the City denied
approval of his building plans and required the opinion of an engineer because it believed
that Mr. van Frank's work went beyond the scope of engineering work an architect is
allowed to perform. While the Court minimizes the importance of two instances as
evidence of a municipal policy, the City has not provided any evidence to rebut Mr. van
Frank's evidence. The fact is that Mr. van Frank provided evidence of two separate
occasions where the City required that his building plans be reviewed and stamped by an
engineer, effectively ignoring the fact that the seal of a licensed architect is sufficient
under state law. See U.C.A. § 58-3a-602.
Evidence of these decisions, at minimum, establishes a question of fact regarding
the existence of an express municipal policy. The City has required on at least two
separate occasions, with the same architect, that the architect's stamped plans be reviewed
by an engineer. No evidence has been presented by the City to refute the evidence which
demonstrates that the actions taken by the City against Mr. van Frank were in fact done in
furtherance of an express municipal policy.
The City's actions against Mr. van Frank also serve as evidence sufficient to raise
a question of fact of a "widespread practice" that while not formally authorized by law, is
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a well settled policy within the City's Building Services Division. Again, the City
provided no evidence to rebut the evidence presented by Mr. van Frank that the City's
actions against him were done in the furtherance of a widespread practice. The City has
taken action against the scope of Mr. van Frank's architect's license on two separate but
factually indistinguishable occasions. At a minimum, there is a material issue of fact as to
the existence of a widespread practice by the City to restrict and limit the scope of an
architect's license without due process.
These decisions were made and/or authorized and defended by Orion Goff,
Director of the City's Building Services Division. As director, Mr. Goff has "final policy
making authority" regarding the approval of building permits. Mr. van Frank provided
sound evidence of repeated, similar decisions by a person with policy making authority
which violated his due process rights while the City provided no evidence to refute the
same. There is at minimum a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the actions
taken by the City against Mr. van Frank were implemented by a person with "final
policymaking authority."
While the district court minimizes the importance of two instances as evidence of a

\

municipal policy, the City has not provided any evidence to rebut Mr. van Frank's
evidence. Of how many instances must Mr. van Frank provide evidence before the City
is required to provide at least some contrary evidence? At minimum, Mr. van Frank has
established a material issue of fact regarding the existence of a municipal policy that
i
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violated his due process rights. The trier of fact could find from the evidence of two
separate and near identical occasions where the City required that Mr. van Frank's
building plans be reviewed and stamped by an engineer, that the city has a policy of
denying architects the ability to engage in the incidental practice of engineering.
The evidence submitted by Mr. van Frank is sufficient to establish a factual dispute
warranting the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment when the City has not
provided any evidence or explanation or rationale for requiring an engineer's opinion
before approving the stamped building plans of a licensed architect. Mr. van Frank
sufficiently alleged the existence of a municipal policy and provided evidence of its
existence sufficient to raise an issue of fact. The district court's ruling that Mr. van Frank
has failed to do so is incorrect and should be reversed.
IV.

MR. VAN FRANK ESTABLISHED GROUNDS SUFFICIENT FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
The district court correctly ruled that Mr. van Frank has standing to seek damages

under his of claims for relief but incorrectly ruled that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to
seek injunctive relief "of the breadth prayed for in his Complaint." (R.242) This latter
ruling should be reversed. Mr. van Frank does indeed have standing to seek injunctive
relief against the City. The breadth of relief sought by Mr. van Frank is not a correct
basis for denying Mr. van Frank's motion for summary judgment and granting the City's
motion for the same.
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In the Complaint, Mr. van Frank seeks an injunction to prevent the City from
restricting the license of an architect by making determinations that an architect has
exceeded the scope of their license and requiring the City to accept all building plans
bearing the stamped seal of a licensed architect. (R. 11,12)
The United States Supreme Court held that to establish standing for prospective
relief, "a plaintiff must demonstrate the realistic probability that he will again be
subjected to the same injurious conduct." See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,
101-02 (1983). The district court downplayed the significance of the City's actions
against Mr. van Frank on two separate but factually indistinguishable occasions. The
district court implies in its decision that more must be shown to prove that there is a high
probability that the City will take the same action against Mr. van Frank in the future.
But given the fact that the City did not provide any evidence or explanation for its actions
against Mr. van Frank under the building code, it is reasonably probable that the City
would take similar action against Mr. van Frank and/or other architects. The City never
presented any evidence that Mr. van Frank's plans were unsafe or otherwise violated the
building code and did not provide any analysis as to why his work exceeded the scope of

<

engineering work that an architect may perform under state law, even assuming it had
authority to do so. The City has also failed to argue or present evidence that these two
instances involving Mr. van Frank were exceptional or unlikely to occur again. The fact
that no evidence or analysis was ever presented by the City is indicative of the arbitrary
i
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nature of the City's decisions on both occasions and establishes a question as to the
realistic probability that the City will continue to make arbitrary and capricious "judgment
calls" regarding the scope of an architect's license.
Mr. van Frank submits that the district court's ruling on this issue is in error and
should be reversed in light of the evidence provided by Mr. van Frank and the complete
lack of evidence provided by the City. If this Court believes the relief sought by Mr. van
Frank was too broad it may tailor the relief sought to prevent further violation of Mr. van
Frank's right to due process. However, the scope of Mr. van Frank's prayer for relief was
not a proper basis to dismiss the entire injunction claim and the district court erred in so
ruling.
V.

MR. VAN FRANK'S DECLARATION IS PROPERLY SUPPORTED FOR
PURPOSES OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Mr. van Frank's statements of fact presented in his declaration are properly

supported for purposes of summary judgment and should have been considered by the
district court. The district court's disregard for these statements is not harmless error and
is prejudicial to Mr. van Frank's case.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court cites with approval the City's
argument that certain statements in Mr. van Frank's declaration are not supported by
evidence in the record and do not support Mr. van Frank's allegations. (R.244-45)
Specifically, the Court cites to paragraph four of Mr. van Frank's declaration in which he
states that his calculations "utilized and applied straight-forward formulas commonly
36
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used by architects, engineers, and others in the building profession." (R.61) This
statement and others similar to it in the declaration are admissible.
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence..." Rule 56(e) Utah R. Civ. P. It
is undisputed that Mr. van Frank is a licensed architect with experience sufficient to have
personal knowledge as to the common practices of architects. Mr. van Frank is qualified
to opine as to the kind of calculations he made on his building plans and whether such
calculations are commonly made in his profession. In the absence of any contrary
evidence, Mr. van Frank's opinions are sufficient to raise a material issue of fact. The
Court's acceptance of the City's argument that these statements of fact are unsupported
by admissible evidence is in error. Mr. van Frank's Declaration is properly supported for
purposes of summary judgment and should have been considered by the district court.
The Declaration at the very least creates a genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment, especially given the fact that the City presented no admissible
evidence to support its Motion or any of its subsequent memoranda.
CONCLUSION
Mr. van Frank requests at a minimum that the district court's ruling granting the
City's motion for summary judgment be reversed and remanded for trial. Mr. van Frank
has established that there are genuine issues of material fact warranting the denial of the
City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore it is requested that this Court rule
i
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that the statements made in Mr. van Frank's Declaration are admissible and that the letter
from Orion Goff, Director of the City's Building Services Division, is not hearsay and
therefore admissible. In light of this evidence, the Court should find that Mr. van Frank's
claims have merit, are supported by admissible evidence and that Mr. van Frank is
entitled to a permanent injunction against the City to prevent it from engaging in future
arbitrary judgment calls which restrict the scope of Mr. van Frank's state-issued
architect's license.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2011.
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

L,l IrtlU
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini
Justin D. Hatch
Attorneys for Appellant, Roger van Frank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 2011,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to:
J. Wesley Robinson
Attorney for Defendant
Room 505, City and County Building
451 South State Street
P.O. Box 145478
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5478

j... tftih
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

Orion Goff Letter (R.87-89)
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DIRECTOR

DEPARTMENT DF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

MAYOR

BUILDING SERVICES AND LICENSING DIVISION

:z

June 29, 2006

A. LDUIS ZUNGUZE
C D M M . DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR

Roger vanFrank
1445 Michigan Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
RE: Architectural Drawings for 1332 Shannon Street, Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Mr. vanFrank:
Mr. vanFrank thanks for taking the time to visit my office this week to discuss the project at 1332
Shannon Street in Salt Lake City. It was a pleasure to meet with you and review a beautiful set
of hand-written architectural drawings that you produced, which represent a great deal of care
not common to current electronically prepared drawings.
I would like to take this time to review our discussion and memorialize in writing the
understanding reached in the meeting. We agreed that the working drawings presented at our
public counter for review and subsequent approval of a building permit are a complete set of
plans and more than adequately represent the work to be accomplished. We also agree that
there is some structural work included in these drawings that we could (and did) accept as
'incidental' to your architectural work on the drawings.
In the meeting we also discussed the fact that the Plan Review Staff at our public counter made
a judgment call, that due to the structural work in the new Breezeway / porte-cochere area, staff
used the International Building Code Section 1614.3 to make this judgment. The code states
that;
EB] 1614.3 Alterations. Alterations are permitted to be made to any structure
without requiring the structure to comply with Sections 1613 through 1623
provided the alterations conform to the requirements for a new structure.
Alterations that increase the seismic force in any existing structural element be
more than 5 percent or decrease the design strength of any existing structural
element to resist seismic forces by more than 5 percent shall not be permitted
unless the entire seismic-force-resisting system is determined to conform to
Sections 1613 through 1623 for a new structure.
Staff made the judgment based on the code language; that removing the structural walls of the
existing building would obviously affect more than 5% of the building element and thus required
a lateral analysis. It is our judgment, based on Utah State Code R156-3a-102 that a lateral
analysis of the area in question to determine the seismic resisting forces would not constitute
'incidental' work for an architect and in fact needed to be done by a licensed professional
engineer. Thus, the contractor enlisted the services of an engineer to do the analysis and
produce a report. The analysis was for the area designated on the plans as the 'breezeway1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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only. Please note that we were perfectly willing to consider the other 'engineering' work on the
drawings as being incidental to the architects design.
Thank you again for the opportunity to meet with you and discuss this issue. As a result of our
meeting and the points you make, we will do additional research on the State law in conjunction
with our legal representatives and train staff to make judgments based upon its most prudent
interpretation.
As discussed, we are willing to meet with you in advance of submittal to discuss this issue as it
relates to any other projects you wish to submit to the City for permit. Please call me if you have
any questions whatsoever in reference to the project. My office phone is (801) 535-6681 and
my cell phone number is (801) 706-0940.
Respectfully,

f~\

Orion Goff, CBO
Building Official
Director, Building Services and Business Licensing

Cc;

Mr. and Mrs. Kim Thomas
D. J. Baxter, Mayors Office
Louis Zunguze, Director, Community Development
Brent Wilde, Assistant Director, Community Development
Larry Butcher, Plan Review Administrator
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ADDENDUM NO. 2

District Court Memorandum Decision (R.236-47)
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RLEDD1STR5GT COURT
Third Judicial District

SEP 1 6 2010
\ \ tt$ALT LAKE COUNTY
^

1—Pj

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROGER VAN FRANK,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. 080919752

SALT LAKE CITY CORP.,

DATE: SEPTEMBER 16, 2010

Defendant

Several motions came before the Court for hearing on June 16, 2010, at the
conclusion of which, the Court took them under advisement On July 22, 2010, the •
Court asked counsel for the parties to provide it with supplemental authorities on two
key points related to these motions. Counsel for the Plaintiff provided authorities as
requested, but candidly acknowledged that he could find ho case law factually on point;
counsel for the Defendant did not submit any additional authority. The matter was .
again submitted for decision on August 10, 2010. Having reviewed the papers,
including the supplemental authorities, and considered the arguments of counsel, the
motions are ripe for decision and the Court hereby addresses them in turn.
I.

THE DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1
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The Defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City"), moves for summary
judgment on the grounds that the Plaintiff, Roger van Frank, has failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; he lacks standing to sue the City; he has failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies;1 and no constitutional violation has occurred.
A.

The Undisputed Material Facts

For purposes of this motion, the parties agree on these material facts: Mr. van
Frank is a licensed architect who provided architectural services for William Buchanan
in approximately June 2007. Mr. Buchanan used Mr. van Frank's architectural drawings
to apply for a building permit with the City's Building Services and Licensing Division
("the Division"). The Division denied Mr. Buchanan's application for a permit at least in
part because it required a structural engineer's opinion regarding Mr. van Frank's
calculations, and/or certifying the safety of the floor system design. Mr. van Frank
alleges that the City improperly denied the permit to Mr. Buchanan, and denied Mr. van
Frank due process by allegedly determining that he exceeded the scope of his
architect's license. Further, it interfered with his economic relationship with his client,
undermined his client's confidence in him, and threatened his ability to continue working
with Mr. Buchanan or his contractor. In doing so, it usurped the role of the Architect's
Licensing Board of the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL") of
the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah. Finally, Mr. van Frank claims that
the City's denial of Mr. Buchanan's building permit deprived him without due process of
a property right to practice architecture, and portrayed him in a false light or defamed
!

This ground was stated in the motion but not briefed in the City's supporting
memorandum.
2
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him. Mr. van Frank alleges that the City for similar reasons denied another clients
application for a building permit.
Mr. van Frank in opposing the City's motion set forth a statement of additional
material facts, to which the City replied in opposition, noting that these are not.properly
supported for purposes of a summary judgment motion and therefore not properly
considered by the Court. Some examples are set forth below in connection with the
Court's discussion of Mr. van Frank's Statement of Material Facts in support of his own
motion for summary judgment.
Mr. van Frank seeks damages, an award of attorney's fees, and a permanent
and mandatory injunction restraining the City "from restricting the lawful practice of
architecture on the basis that an architect has exceeded the scope of his license in
engaging in the incidental practice of engineering and from denying building permits to
the clients of licensed architects on such basis." He urges the Court to require the City
to seek review from the Department of Commerce instead of denying a permit in
circumstances similar to his, and to "accept an architect's stamp appearing on plans as
evidence that the plans and calculations shown thereon have been competently
prepared by a licensed professional."
B.

Whether the Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief May Be Granted

The City's first argument is that Mr. van Frank's Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Its supporting memorandum provides no analysis
pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but challenges Mr. van Frank's right
to relief based on the facts he asserts in the Complaint-an argument more commonly
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made under the aegis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The City notes that Mr. van Frank's Amended Complaint identifies no specific
Constitutional or federal basis for his causes of action, but instead states that his due
process rights have been violated. The City proceeds with an analysis of the Amended
Complaint pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983.
Reviewing the Amended Complaint, the Court confirms that there is no explicit
reference to that statute. Instead, under the First Claim for Relief (Civil Rights
Violation), Mr. van Frank states, "In making a determination that Plaintiff had engaged
in unprofessional conduct by violating the scope of incidental practice of engineering
allowed an architect under state law without due process, in violation of the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of Utah, Defendant violated Plaintiffs civil
rights and impaired a property interest of Plaintiff, namely the right to practice
architecture as licensed by the State of Utah."
The Court concludes that Mr. van Frank's factual allegations set forth in the
Amended Complaint, are sufficient. He has alleged that the City's actions in rejecting
the plans his client submitted with incidental engineering calculations he was entitled to
make pursuant to his architect's license, deprived him of a property interest secured by
the United States Constitution and other law, without affording him an opportunity to be
heard, These are colorable claims that the City's actions violated his due process
rights.
The City also points out, correctly, that tort claims such as interference with
business relations and defamation do not give rise to a cause of action for violation of
due process under section 1983. But Mr. van Frank's Complaint did not assert a tort
4
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claim, and the Court interprets his use of these phrases as a characterization of the
stigmatizing injuries he received, rather than an assertion of a substantive claim for
relief.
Next, the City argues that because it cannot be liable under section 1983 based
on a theory of respondeat superior, and Mr, van Frank "has not alleged the existence of
any custom, policy or practice of the City that contributed in any way to the alleged
constitutional violations," he has not stated a claim for relief.
Municipal liability may be based on any of the following: (1) an express municipal
policy; (2) a "widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is 'so pervasive and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage1
with the force of law;" or (3) the decision of a person with "final policymaking authority."
City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112,123,127 (1988). The analysis focuses on
whether Mr. van Frank's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and if so,
whether the City is responsible for that violation.
Mr. van Frank has not alleged that the City had an officially promulgated policy
pursuant to which his constitutional rights were violated. Instead, what he alleges is
that the City made a determination that Mr. van Frank in two instances exceeded the
scope of incidental practice of engineering allowed an architect under state law. Mr.
van Frank's memorandum identifies these as the "policy" pursuant to which he was
deprived, without an opportunity to be heard, of his property right interest in the full
exercise of his license. But a two-instance limit on Mr. van Frank's incidental practice of
engineering is not a deprivation of his right to practice the occupation for which he has
been licensed, and the Court concludes that Mr. van Frank has not stated a claim upon
5
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which relief can be granted with respect to municipal liability. The City's motion for
summary judgment on this basis is accordingly granted.
C.

Whether Mr. Van Frank Has Standing to Sue the City

The City argues that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to sue the City over its denial
of a building permit sought by his client, who, it contends is the only person with
standing to bring such a suit. This section of the City's memorandum in support of its
motion cites no authority for its position, and the City declined the Court's request to
provide supplemental authority on this point.
Mr. van Frank's opposition memorandum identifies the basic elements of
establishing standing: a party must show that he has been or will be adversely affected
by the challenged actions, allege a causal relationship between the injury, the
challenged actions, and the relief requested, and the relief request must be
substantially likely to redress the injury claimed. He notes that each of these elements
is present in this case, albeit without authority, and argues that the identity of the
person applying for the permit does not determine standing. Instead, he focuses on the
harm to him as a consequence of the City's denial: it denied him the ability to engage in
the incidental practice of engineering, thereby harming his reputation with his clients.
In reply, the City argues that none of its actions impaired Mr. van Frank's license,
he has no property interest in the incidental practice of engineering that would entitle
him to the protections he seeks, and further his allegations of damage to his
professional reputation are not actionable, but it does not revisit the argument that Mr:
van Frank's client is the only person with standing to bring an action based on the
denial of the building permit.
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A plaintiff has standing to sue under section 1983 if he or she meets traditional
standing requirements, and while it is generally true that in such actions a plaintiff must
assert her own rights and not the rights of a third party, when the rights of these
persons are closely related, the action may proceed. See e.g. Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106,113-116 (1976). The Court concludes that Mr. van Frank has standing with
respect to the claims for which he seeks damages.
This is not the end of the analysis, however. Mr. van Frank's prayer for relief
includes a request for a permanent and mandatory injunction restraining the City "from
restricting a licensed architect's ability to practice architecture by making any
determination that such architect has exceeded the scope of incidental practice of
engineering allowed an architect under state law, requiring Defendants to accept plans
stamped by a licensed architect as competently drawn."
The United States Supreme Court has established a specific doctrine when a
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief pursuant to section 1983. To establish standing for
prospective relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate the realistic probability that he will again
be subjected to the same injurious conduct. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95,101-102 (1983). In this case, that would depend upon whether the City is likely
to reject Mr. van Frank's plans for similar reasons in the future. The fact that it has
done so on two occasions in the past is not dispositive of whether there is a sufficient
probability that it will do so in the future, either with respect to Mr. van Frank or the
entire universe of licensed architects whose clients may seek City permits. The Court
concludes that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to seek injunctive relief of the breadth
prayed for in his Complaint, and the City therefore is entitled to summary judgment on
7
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Mr; van Frank's Second Claim for Relief.
D.

Whether a Constitutional Violation Occurred

The City's final argument is that it has taken no action that deprived Mr. van
Frank of his constitutionally protected property rights-it merely denied Mr. Buchanan's
application for a building permit based on legitimate safety concerns regarding the
plans and drawings submitted. The rest of its argument is essentially a variation on its
standing argument and its argument that Mr. van Frank's license was not affected by
any action taken by the City. Mr. van Frank responds by pointing to the City's asserted
reason for denying Mr. Buchanan's building permit, with no discussion of safety or
building codes. He proceeds with a variation of his argument that the City lacks the
authority to determine that an architect's engineering was more than incidental.
Because these arguments have been addressed above, the Court need not repeat,
them here.
E.

Conclusion

The Court grants the City's motion for summary judgment because the City's
rejection of proposed pians in two instances does not demonstrate a policy of limiting
Mr. van Frank's practice of architecture incidental to which he may engage in
engineering. The Court denies the'City's motion insofar as it is based upon an
argument that Mr. van Frank lacks standing to seek damages* but grants it insofar as it
seeks injunctive relief of the scope set forth in the Complaint's Second Claim for Relief.
II.

THE PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF DEFENDANT'S
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mr. van Frank moves the Court to strike portions of the Defendant's Reply
8
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Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment because some of the factual
statements that responded to his Additional Statement of Facts are unsupported by
citation to admissible evidence, and because two arguments are raised for the first time
and are not properly included in a reply memorandum.
The City responds that the motion was not filed in a timely fashion, relying upon
Rule 12(h), Mr. van Frank correctly points.out that Rule 12(h) applies to pleadings, and
not to a motion.
The City adds that Mr. van Frank's motion lacks specificity, and fails to
appreciate that most of its responses to his additional facts were objections based on
various reasons. The Court determines that the motion must be denied for the reasons
stated by the City. Similarly, his motion with respect to the City's arguments must be
denied. These were an appropriate response to.Mr. van Frank's opposition
memorandum.
III.

PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Mr. van Frank moves for summary judgment, seeking damages and a permanent

injunction against the City for its alleged violation of his substantive due process rights.
In support of his motion, Mr. van Frank sets forth a statement of material facts that does
not substantially differ from the facts set forth above in connection with the City's motion
and they need not be repeated in this section.
Significantly, however, the City disputes some of Mr. van Frank's statements of
material fact, noting that these are not properly supported for purposes of a summary
judgment motion and therefore not properly considered by the Court. For example, Mr.
van Frank stated that his calculations "utilized and applied straight-forward formulas
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commonly used by architects, engineers, and others in the building profession." It
notes that this is a statement of opinion, not supported by evidence in the record that
wouid be admissible at trial. Similarly, Mr. van Frank's allegations regarding the basis
for the Division's conditional denial of Mr. Buchanan's building permit are based on
unspecified information and belief. Events connected with another client's case are
supported by inadmissible hearsay. They point out that there is no admissible evidence
in support of Mr. van Frank's allegations that the Division made determinations
concerning the scope of practice permitted under state licensing law. "At most, the
factual record demonstrates that the Division required the opinion of a structural
engineer to certify the safety of the proposed building design before it would approve
the application for a building permit."
Mr. van Frank argues that the Division has no authority under State Code or City
ordinance to determine whether an architect exceeded the permissible scope of
incidental engineering permitted by Utah law. He contends that the Division's actions in
requiring his client to obtain an engineer's opinion as to the accuracy of his calculations,
and as a condition for approving the plans he drew, denied him the ability to practice his
profession.
The Court would be compelled to deny Mr. van Frank's motion on the bases of
these factual disputes. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth in connection with its
analysis of the City's motion for summary judgment, it also determines that as a matter
of law, Mr. van Frank is not entitled to summary judgment. The! motion is therefore
denied.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above, Mr. van Frank's Motion to Strike Portions of
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment is denied; the City's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; Mr. van Frank's Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied. This Memorandum Decision shall constitute the order of the
Court.
Dated this

J
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KATEA. TOOMEY' %
DIST^JCJ^p^RT JUDGE
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